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PROTECTING THE PUBLIC FROM THEMSELVES:
THE FIRST AMENDMENT, PUBLIC POLICY, AND
OUR FAILURE TO PROTECT DISSENT
Aryn Pedowitz*
I. INTRODUCTION
News anchor David Brinkley once said, "[T]he news is
whatever I say it is."' The statement holds true today. The
press defines the news when deciding what to investigate,
what to report, and how to present information. Journalism
students learn the necessity of the free press, and most
Americans themselves believe in the principle of a free press.2
The aftermath of September 11, 2001 provided a new genera-
tion of Americans and communications students' with a re-
cent example of the inadequacy of the First Amendment's
protection of the "freedom of the press."
In mid-October of 2001, National Security Advisor Con-
* Articles Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 44. J.D. Candidate,
Santa Clara University School of Law; B.S., University of Florida.
1. See Rowan Ford, News Media Responsibility - A Program for Improve-
ment, 17 WILLAMErrE L. REV. 231 (1980).
2. Please note that the terms "press" and "media" are used interchangea-
bly throughout this comment. These terms are used to describe journalism
news outlets as a whole, with no distinction between the print and broadcast
press unless specifically stated, and in no way are used in reference to the vari-
ous forms of entertainment that the term media also encompasses. The focus of
this comment is the "mainstream media," the media from which the majority of
the population gets its news and information. Although alternative forms of
information and news exist, the "alternative" press is not at issue in this com-
ment.
3. This "new generation" consists of people who were infants during the
Vietnam and Korean Wars and people not yet born at that time. These people
may have learned about the repression of speech during past decades, but they
had not seen true suppression of dissent in their lifetime.
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doleezza Rice requested that television networks use caution
when broadcasting Osama bin Laden's speeches. Press Sec-
retary Ari Fleischer later told the White House press corps:
"At best, Osama bin Laden's messages are propaganda calling
on people to kill Americans. At worst, he could be issuing or-
ders to his followers to initiate such attacks."4 This may be
the closest the Bush Administration has come to censoring
privately owned media. Although a request from the gov-
ernment is a powerful thing, it is not censorship. In fact,
most of the press continued to report on the bin Laden
speeches; many played portions of the tapes while others only
summarized the content.
Though the government did not formally censor the press
following the 9/11 attacks, the government did severely criti-
cize many public figures for voicing unpopular opinions
through the press.' Bill Maher, host of the television show
"Politically Incorrect," vocally expressed his dissident views.
6
On air, Maher opined that labeling the terrorists as cowards
was inaccurate since they actually stayed in the planes that
hit the buildings, while we [Americans] were "lobbing cruise
missiles from 2,000 miles away."7 In the face of public outcry,
withdrawal of major sponsors and cancellation of the show by
affiliates, Maher apologized on air for the statement! In re-
sponse to this event the White House stated: "There are re-
minders to all Americans that they need to watch what they
4. Tim Jones & Bob Kemper, TVPressed on bin Laden Tapes, CHI. TRIB.,
Oct. 11, 2001, at 1.
5. See Bill Carter & Felicity Barringer, Speech and Expression; In Patri-
otic ime, Dissent is Muted, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2001, at Al; see also infra
Part III.B.
6. See Dan Trigoboff, Station Break, BROAD. & CABLE, Oct. 1, 2001, at 20;
After the Attack; Sears, FedEx Pull TV Ads In Protest, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 20,
2001, at Al, Part 1, page 28; David K. Li, Big-Mouth Backlash; American Cow-
ards'Quip Hurts Maher-Sponsors Yank Ads, N.Y. POST, Sept. 20, 2001, at 89.
7. The complete statement was, "We have been the cowards lobbing cruise
missiles from 2,000 miles away. That's cowardly. Staying in the airplane when
it hits the building, say what you want about it, it's not cowardly." See Li, su-
pra note 6, at 89.
S. Carter & Barringer, supra note 5.
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say, watch what they do, and this is not a time for remarks
like that."'
The "Politically Incorrect" incident sadly reminds us that
Maher's statements and the statements made by the show's
guests are the types of expression that most deserve First
Amendment protection. ° They are the dissident viewpoints
that the public lacks in the majority of "mainstream" press.
What is important about the incident is that Maher was not
censored by the government, but by corporate America's reac-
tion to the American public's outcry over what was said."
Although the Bill of Rights, specifically the First
Amendment, protects us from the tyranny of the majority
through government control, 2 it does not protect us from that
same tyranny caused by private entities." Though a literal
interpretation of the speech and press clause and the theory
of a free and responsible press are adequate for theoretical
law and communications discussions, the debate misses how
private censorship and economic market forces affect how
well and responsibly the press serves democracy. 4 In light of
9. Jennifer Harper, Reporters Struggle to Balance Patriotism, WASH.
TIMES, Sept. 28, 2001, at A4.
10. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 429 (1992) (Stevens, J., con-
curring) ("[W]hen government regulates political speech or 'the expression of
editorial opinion on matters of public importance,' 'First Amendment protec-
tio[n] is 'at its zenith."") (quoting FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 486
U.S. 364, 375-76 (1984); Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425 (1988)) (second al-
teration in original).
11. See Trigoboff, supra note 6, at 20.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press. . ." (emphasis added).
13. Cf First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784-85 (1978)
(Congress recognizes that corporations have a First Amendment right to
"speak" on issues which do not materially affect the corporations business in-
terests). But cf Bill Shaw, Corporate Speech in the Marketplace of Ideas, 7 J.
CORP. L. 265, 277 (1982) ("Although the broad interpretation of corporate first
amendment rights in the recent Supreme Court cases being discussed appears
to encourage free expression, these decisions may actually restrict it ... [T]hey
'muffle the voices of most of us by amplifying the voices of those who have more
money."') (quoting Rembard, For Sale: Freedom ofSpeech, THE ATLANTIC 27-28
(March 1981)).
14. See, e.g., Robert M. Entman, Putting the First Amendment in Its Place:
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the changes in the institution of the press, the question be-
comes whether the government should and can help protect
us from ourselves.
This comment first reviews policies underlying the First
Amendment15 and the regulations and rules that government
has applied to the press, including the different treatment of
print and broadcast media with regard to licensing, content
and ownership. 6 It continues by exploring the changes that
the laws and the press as an industry have undergone, to il-
lustrate the current state of the media and First Amendment
protection.17 This comment then analyzes the press in the
U.S. free-market system, the limitations imposed by the eco-
nomic market, and how both the market system and its limi-
tations hinder the policy of protecting the press, 8 using the
aftermath of 9/11 as an example. 9 It concludes by calling for
the press to be accountable for their actions in the free-
market and suggests proposals for disclosure similar to those
used in the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).2 °
This comment also suggests economic incentives,2' and volun-
tary self-regulation as a means of reducing the adverse af-
fects of the economic market.22
II. BACKGROUND
A. First Amendment Policy
Although there are many different views of the policy
underlying the First Amendment, perhaps the most impor-
Enhancing American Democracy through the Press, 1993 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 61,
78 (1993) (" [E]xposing media owners to the full force of market competition and
consumer demand, greatly affects the ideas that broadcasters can practically
choose to produce and distribute if they want to stay in business.").
15. See discussion infra Part II.A.
16. See discussion infra Part II.B.
17. See discussion infra Part II.C.
18. See discussion infra Part III.A.
19. See discussion infra Part III.B.
20. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
21. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
22. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
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tant is the protection of the press as an institution.2 ' The
framers recognized the catalytic role that the press has in
providing diverse and controversial information and the im-
portance this role plays in a free and democratic society.
24
Freedom of speech and the press promotes the discovery of
truth25 and ensures an informed self-government.26
In 1919, Justice Holmes introduced the marketplace of
ideas theory to America:
[Men... may come to believe.., that the ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas - that the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market and that truth
is the only ground upon which their wishes can be safely
carried out.
27
Holmes analogized the exchange of ideas and information to
the exchange of products on the market; people place their
"products," in the form of ideas, on the market and "custom-
ers" will choose what to listen to and believe. 28 This theory
focused on potential benefits to the whole society rather than
on benefits to the individual speaker. 9
In 1966, Justice Black observed, "Whatever differences
may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment,
23. See David Joseph Onorato, Press Privilege for the Worst of Times, 75
GEO. L.J. 361, 366 (1986) (discussing Justice Stewart's acknowledgement that
the press was protected as an institution in order to insulate it from govern-
ment pressures).
24. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 27 (Harper & Row 1965) (1948) ("The principle of the
freedom of speech springs from the necessities of the program of self-
government. It is not a Law of Nature or of Reason in the abstract. It is a de-
duction from the basic American agreement that public issues shall be decided
by universal suffrage."). See also MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM
OF SPEECH § 1.02[A] (1984) ("It is the enlightenment function which constitutes
the foundation upon which the First Amendment edifice largely rests.").
25. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting).
26. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 24, at 57.
27. SeeAbrams, 250 U.S. at 630.
28. Id.
29. See generally ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED
STATES (1941) (discussing the various rationales for free speech).
2003]
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there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose
of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of gov-
ernmental affairs."" Justice Stewart also acknowledged the
important role that the press plays in Branzburg v. Hayes,3
by writing that the press receives protection in order to serve
"the broad societal interest in a full and free flow of informa-
tion to the public. It is this basic concern underlying the
Constitution's protection of a free press."32  The role of the
press is imperative in ensuring "open and robust" debate and
having an informed public ready to engage in discussion on
politics and world issues. The press delivers to the public the
information necessary for this type of debate.33
The self-governance rational of First Amendment policy
is rooted in the Declaration of Independence, which states,
"governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just
powers from the consent of the governed."3" If the legitimate
authority of the government truly comes from the consent of
the governed, then those granting their consent must be well
informed.
B. Regulation of Media: Differences in Licensing and
Ownership
Although the government has never subjected the news-
paper industry to legislation,3 the government has regulated
the broadcast industry since its inception.36 Congress justi-
30. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
31. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
32. Id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
33. See Yochai Benkler, VIACOM-CBS Merger. From Consumers to Users.:
Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons
and UserAccess, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561 (2000).
34. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
35. The Newspaper Preservation Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1802(2) (1970), is the only
statute directly affecting newspapers. While newspapers are subject to anti-
trust laws, this Act is an exemption that allows two competing newspapers to
combine business operations if one of the papers is determined to be "failing"
under the statute.
36. In 1912, Congress passed the Radio Communications Act, which forbade
radio operators to transmit without a license. See Radio Communications Act,
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fled the intrusion based on the limitations of the broadcast
spectrum37 and decided to regulate the spectrum as a limited
resource to ensure diversity. Congress later created what is
now the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to regu-
late the spectrum and license broadcasters. 9
1. Licensing of Broadcasters Based on Content
Since the Communications Act of 1927, the government
has awarded licenses in accordance with "convenience, public
interest, [and] necessity." ° The Federal Radio Commission
(FRC), which enforced the Act, described the system as one
where broadcasters "must be operated as if owned by the pub-
lic."41 Acting as public trustees, broadcasters had to deal
fairly with important public issues by airing all viewpoints
and treating all candidates equally and without bias during
elections.42
To renew their licenses, broadcasters had to show that
they adhered to the standards of content and behavior that
the Commission promulgated.43 The FCC replaced the FRC
with the passage of the Communications Act of 1934, but the
regulatory duties and enforcement remained unchanged.4
Pub. L. No. 62-264, 37 Stat. 302 (1912).
37. See Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 212-13 (1943).
38. See id. at 213-26 (discussing the rational behind the Act).
39. In the Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1162, Congress created the Federal
Radio Commission [hereinafter FRC], which assigned frequencies to applicants.
In 1934, the FRC was replaced by the Federal Communications Commission
(hereinafter FCC). See Nat7 Broad Co., 319 U.S. at 212-14 (discussing the evo-
lution of the FCC).
40. See 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1994).
41. In re Schaeffer Radio Co. (1930), reprinted in part in The Federal Radio
Commission and the Public Service Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees, 11
FED. COMM. BAR J. 5, 14 (1950).
42. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1994).
43. The FRC, and later the FCC, set the criteria on which applicants should
initially receive and, later, be eligible for renewal of their licenses. See Erwin
G. Krasnow & Jack Goodman, The "Public Interest" Standard: The Search for
the Holy Grail, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 605, 606-07 (1998) (discussing the origins of
the public interest standard).
44. See generally, 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1994). Though the 1934 Act replaced the
FRC with the FCC, the objectives of communications regulatory legislation have
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The Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of the
FCC's licensing regulations in National Broadcasting Co. v.
United StatesP and found that "the right of free speech does
not include.., the right to [broadcast] without a license."46
The FCC revised its guidelines in 1960 and outlined fourteen
of the "major elements usually necessary to meet the public
interest."47 The Commission eventually specified that these
general guidelines include a minimum amount of time for
news, public affairs, and other non-entertainment program-
ming. They also required adherence to the fairness doc-
trine,49 and programming rules for prime-time."
Beyond FCC regulations, the National Association of
Broadcasters articulated standards of professionalism in the
Television Code.5' The NAB Code created a means of self-
remained substantially unaltered since 1927. See also NatJ Broad Co., 319
U.S. at 214 (1943).
45. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
46. Id. at 227.
47. Report and Statement of Policy Research: Commission en banc Pro-
gramming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303, 2314 (1960). The elements are: (1) opportu-
nity for local self-expression, (2) the development and use of local talent, (3)
programs for children, (4) religious programs, (5) educational programs, (6) pub-
lic affairs programs, (7) editorialization by licensees, (8) political broadcasts, (9)
agricultural programs, (10) news programs, (11) weather and market reports,
(12) sports programs, (13) service to minority groups, (14) entertainment pro-
grams. Id.
48. See Amendment to Section 0.281 of the Commission's Rules: Delega-
tions of Authority to the Chief, Broadcast Bureau, 59 F.C.C.2d 491, 493 (1976).
49. In brief, the fairness doctrine required broadcasters to attend to public
issues and to ensure a diversity of views. In practice, it seems to have done the
opposite. See infra Part II.B.
50. See Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
with Respect to Competition and Responsibility in Network Broadcasting, 23
F.C.C.2d 382, 385-88 (1970).
51. National Association of Broadcasters, Television Code (22 ed. 1981), per-
tinent provisions reprinted in United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters, 553
F. Supp, 621, 625 (D.D.C. 1982) (consent decree)) [hereinafter NAB Code]. The
Association was established in 1923 and was organized to establish codes of eth-
ics within the broadcast industry by creating guidelines for self-regulation. See
Patricia Brosterhous, United States v. National Association of Broadcasters:
The Deregulation of Self-Regulation, 35 Fed. Comm. L.J. 313, 320 (1983). The
NAB Code set industry wide standards for a variety of issues dealing with child,
political, and religious programming, as well as advertising and the treatment
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regulation and provided a feeling of community responsibil-
ity.52 Roughly seventy percent of stations subscribed to the
NAB Code, and the Association denied violators the right to
post the Seal of Good Practice on the station's transmittal.53
In 1982, thirty years after the NAB Code's creation, a portion
of the NAB Code, relating to advertising, was outlawed on
antitrust grounds.54 Shortly thereafter, in January 1983, the
National Association of Broadcasters abolished the NAB
Code.55
The elimination of the NAB Code coincided with a sig-
nificant period of broadcasting industry deregulation during
the Reagan Administration.56 The FCC and the courts largely
eliminated the fairness doctrine and removed many of the
specific public interest requirements.57 However, if a broad-
caster sells airtime to a political candidate, it must sell simi-
of news and public events. Id.
52. The section on community responsibility provided: "Television broad-
casters and their staffs occupy positions of unique responsibility in their com-
munities and should conscientiously endeavor to be acquainted fully with the
community's needs and characteristics in order better to serve the welfare of its
citizens." NAB Code, supra note 51.
53. See JOHN R. BITTNER, BROADCAST LAW AND REGULATION 363 (1982).
54. See United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters, 536 F. Supp. 149
(D.D.C. 1982). The Justice Department alleged that the provisions of the Code
restricting advertising had the purpose and effect of restricting the amount of
advertising on television, causing prices to rise above competitive levels. Id. at
149. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the government. Id. at
170.
55. See In the Matter of Children's Television Programming and Adver.
Practices, 96 F.C.C.2d 634, 640-41 n.21 (1984).
56. See WILLIAM B. RAY, FCC: THE UPS AND DOWNS OF RADIO-TV
REGULATION 162 (1990) (documenting that in 1981, with Mark Fowler as
Reagan's newly appointed chairman of the FCC, the Commission "busily rein-
terpreted the Communications Act so as to dismantle much of the structure of
broadcast regulation").
57. See The Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, As-
certainment Requirements, and Program Log Requirements for Commercial
Television Stations, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076 (1984); see also Syracuse Peace Council v.
Television Station WTVH, 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 5043, 5054-55 (1987) (repealing most of
the fairness doctrine), affidsuh. nom. Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d
654 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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lar time to opposing candidates." Congress codified this re-
quirement 9 in a longstanding provision that requires a
broadcaster offering to sell time to do so at the "lowest unit
charge"; however, some of these requirements remain such as
limiting the unit rate of political advertising during the forty-
five days before a primary election and during the sixty days
before a general or special election.6"
During 1997 and 1998, a presidential advisory committee
met to discuss digital television broadcasters' public interest
obligations." The committee recommended that a voluntary
code be adopted and went so far as to include a model.62 The
code was never implemented.
2. Different Levels of Protection and Content
Regulation
Two cases established the differing First Amendment
protection for broadcasters and print media: Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC3 and Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo.' In Red Lion, the Supreme Court held that regula-
tions mandating a right-of-reply in broadcasting served First
Amendment goals and were constitutionally acceptable.65 At
58. See47 U.S.C. § 315 (1994).
59. Id.
60. 47 U.S.C. § 315(b).
61. The Advisory Committee was charged with developing recommenda-
tions concerning public interest obligations to be imposed on television stations
as they convert to digital television. See Exec. Order No. 13,038, 62 Fed. Reg.
12,065 (1997).
62. The Committee even included a model code drafted by Professor Cass
Sunstein. See Angela J. Campbell, Self-Regulation and the Media, 51 FED.
COMM L.J. 711, 712 (1999).
63. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). The broadcaster carried a program series titled
"The Christian Crusade." Id. at 371. During the program, Rev. Billy Hargis
criticized a reporter who wrote an unflattering biography of Barry Goldwater.
Id. at 371. The station refused to allow the reporter an opportunity to reply to
the attack in violation of the fairness doctrine. Id. at 372. The Supreme Court
unanimously endorsed the right to defend oneself and stated the importance of
the public's access to ideas and their right to be fully informed. Id. at 379-86.
64. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
65. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 367.
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issue in Red Lion, the fairness doctrine provided that "broad-
casters have certain obligations to afford reasonable opportu-
nity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public
importance."66 In practice, the doctrine required that broad-
casters present discussion of public issues and ensure balance
in the discussion of public issues." Because the Court found
that the regulation served a paramount issue of public impor-
tance, the Court allowed the FCC to ignore broadcasters' edi-
torial judgment and control the content of broadcasts.68
In contrast, the Miami Herald court held that the First
Amendment protected print media from the effects of the
fairness doctrine. The Supreme Court held that content regu-
lation in the form of a right-of-reply is unconstitutional when
applied to the print media due to the infringement on edito-
rial discretion.69 While recognizing economic barriers on en-
try into the industry, the Court rejected economic scarcity as
justification for content regulation." Ignoring the precedent
and rational of Red Lion,7 the Court noted the importance of
gathering information from diverse and antagonistic
sources. 2 Interpreting the speech and press clause literally,
66. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1910 (1996).
67. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 378.
68. See id. at 389.
There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the Govern-
ment from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and
to conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present
those views and voices which are representative of his community ....
It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the broadcasters, which
is paramount.
Id. at 389-90.
69. Miami Herald, 418 U.S. 241, 248. The Florida statute under review
provided that when newspapers attacked the character of a political candidate,
they were required to provide free and equal space in the paper for the candi-
date to reply. Id. at 244.
70. See id at 248-58.
71. See Stephen J. Shapiro, One and the Same: How Internet Non-
Regulation Undermines the Rationales Used to Support Broadcast Regulation,
8 MEDIA L. & POLY 1, 4 (1999) ("The Court made no mention of Red Lion, which
had been decided only five years prior.").
72. Miami Herald, 418 U.S. at 252 (quoting Assoc. Press v. United States,
326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)).
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the Court further stated that any imposition on editorial con-
trol was clearly unconstitutional."
Though economic scarcity did not justify the content
regulation of newspapers, the argument proved successful in
justifying content regulations for cable programming in Berk-
shire Cablevision v. Burke.4  The district court stated that
the distinction between economic and allocational scarcity7"
becomes immaterial if the scarcity results in the removal of
the means of expressing ideas from all but a small group.7 6
Distinguishing Miami Herald, the court explained that when
access is denied, a pamphlet or other publication provides an
alternative within the same medium as a newspaper, but the
medium of cable offers no similar solution.77
3. Ownership Regulations
Although antitrust laws regulate ownership in the news-
paper industry," the Supreme Court has held that ownership
caps" and prohibitions on co-ownership0 are constitutionally
73. Id. at 258.
74. 571 F. Supp. 976 (D.R.I. 1983), vacated on other grounds, 773 F.2d 382
(1st Cir. 1985). A cable operator sued a Rhode Island utility division seeking a
declaratory judgment that the regulations requiring cable companies to carry
public, educational, and governmental channels were unconstitutional because
they violated the operator's First Amendment rights. Berkshire Cablevision,
571 F. Supp. at 979-80. The court stated that the scarcity rationale applied to
cable, and the cable operator's editorial control was not immune from regula-
tion. See id. at 986-87.
75. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400 (1969). Numerical scar-
city concerns the number of broadcast stations, and allocational scarcity deals
with the reality that the broadcast spectrum simply is not large enough to ac-
commodate everyone who wants to use it. Id.
76. The district court concluded that the access rules served governmental
interests because the First Amendment goal of maintaining a clear flow of in-
formation could be satisfied by having cable open to the public. See id. at 986-
88.
77. See id. at 986.
78. See Newspaper Preservation Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1802(2) (1970).
79. The FCC would not license broadcasters if "the applicant, directly or in-
directly, has an interest in other stations beyond a limited number." United
States v. Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. 192, 193 (1956).
80. The FCC's mass media regulations barred the license or transfer of
newspaper/broadcast combinations to a final owner who controlled a radio or
PROTECTING DISSENT
acceptable when applied to broadcasters.8' The Court deter-
mined that structural regulations like these protect diverse
and antagonistic news sources that serve the public interest
in obtaining diversity, and therefore further First Amend-
ment objectives."2 In Storer Broadcasting Co.,8 the Court
held that limitations on the number of broadcast stations
held by a single owner were constitutional."
Similarly, in FCC v. National Citizen's Committee for
Broadcasting," the Supreme Court determined whether the
FCC could prohibit a single party from owning both a broad-
cast station and a newspaper in the same community." The
Court stated: "[I]t is unrealistic to expect true diversity from
a commonly owned broadcast station-newspaper combination.
The divergency of their viewpoints cannot be expected to be
the same as if they were antagonistically run."87 Since the
regulation did not entirely prevent one's ability to publish a
newspaper, the Court found that it raised no First Amend-
ment issues. "
C. The Evolution of the Press: Changes in Ownership and
Regulations
Although the language of the First Amendment has not
changed, the press has undergone dynamic changes in recent
decades. 8 The marketplace of ideas is now an economic mar-
broadcast station and a daily paper within the same community. See FCC v.
Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 786-89 (1978).
81. Berkshire Cablevision, 571 F. Supp. at 986; see generally Nat'J Citizens
Comm. forBroad., 436 U.S. 775.
82. See Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad, 436 U.S. at 798-801.
83. 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
84. Id. at 201.
85. 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 797 (quoting In re Amendment of Sections 73.34, 73.240 and
73.636 of the Commission's Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard,
FM and Television Broadcast Stations, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 53
F.C.C.2d 589 (released June 5, 1975)).
88. See id. at 776.
89. See BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY 1-15 (Beacon Press
2000) (1983).
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ket.9" The institution of the press has grown from independ-
ently owned newspapers to oligopolies in newspapers and
broadcast media.9 With this change in structure, the media
no longer competes in a theoretical marketplace of ideas, but
in a true economic marketplace.92 The press no longer
searches for listeners, but for circulation and viewer numbers
that will attract advertisers and raise profits.9'
1. The Newspaper Industry
The number of daily newspapers in America has fallen
steadily from 2,600 in 1909 to approximately 1,800 today.94
In 1940, eighty percent of the newspapers in America were
independently owned, but by 1989 corporations owned eighty
percent. 95
In 1992, only twenty corporations owned fifty percent of
the industry. 96 Because of the trend toward concentration
and the economies of scale available to large corporate own-
ers, ninety-eight percent of cities have just one daily newspa-
per.97 This concentration of ownership has both affected the
industry and altered the content of the news.98 The creation
of a powerful lobby, a change in coverage, and the presenta-
tion of a corporate perspectives resulted from this concentra-
90. See Peter L. Kahn, Media Competition in the Marketplace of Ideas, 39
SYRACUSE L. REV. 737, 780 (1988) ("As a market-oriented industry, content had
to be structured to appeal to a mass readership.").
91. See BAGDIKIAN, supra note 89, at 4 ("At the end of World War II, for ex-
ample, 80 percent of the daily newspapers in the United States were independ-
ently owned, but by 1989 the proportion was reversed, with 80 percent owned
by corporate chains.").
92. See id.
93. See infra Part II.C.1.
94. See COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE
PRESS 36-37; NORMAN E. ISAACS, UNTENDED GATES: THE MISMANAGED PRESS
101 (1986) (discussing changes in the newspaper industry).
95. See Ronnie Dugger, The Corporate Domination of Journalism, in THE
BUSINESS OF JOURNALISM 89 (William Serrin ed., 2000).
96. See id.
97. See BAGDIKIAN, supra note 89, at 8.
98. Seeid. at 12-17.
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tion.99
In 1969, the seven largest newspaper companies lobbied
for the Newspaper Preservation Act,' 0 which allows publish-
ers of competing newspapers to merge their operations if one
of the newspapers is failing.' The Department of Justice op-
posed the passage.0 2 The president of Company Publishing
wrote a letter to President Nixon stating that "many... im-
portant publishers and friends of your administration" were
pushing for the passage of the bill and relying on the Presi-
dent's support.' The administration reversed its stance and
the bill passed.0 4 However, not all newspapers supported the
legislation.'0 ' Among other newspapers, the New York Times
lobbied against it and the Courier-Journal called it a "gov-
ernmental favor"06 that threatened "the independence of the
press."0 7 News lobbies continue to have significant influence
due to its control of hundreds of media outlets.'
Corporate management style has altered the content cov-
erage of newspapers, skewing coverage in favor of corporate
values.' 9 The management of newspapers now resembles the
management of a corporation and shares the same goal:
99. See discussion infra Part II.C.1.
100. See Newspaper Preservation Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1802(2) (1970).
101. See id. § 1802(2).
102. Stephen F. Ross, Reaganist Realism Comes to Detroit, 1989 U. ILL. L.
REV. 399, 419 n.109 (1989).
103. Suzanne Garment, The Most Serious Threat is Abuse of Pivilege, 30
COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. 44, 48 (Nov. 1991).
104. See id. Cox and Scripp-Howard gave Nixon full support and were major
beneficiaries of the Act. These papers also suppressed damaging Watergate
stories. See id.
105. JAMES D. SQUIRES, READ ALL ABOUT IT! THE CORPORATE TAKEOVER OF
AMERICA'S NEWSPAPERS 12 (Times Books 1994) (1993).
106. Id. at 12-13.
107. Id. at 13.
108. For example, in 1988, Knight-Ridder significantly toned down editorials
critical of the Attorney General and ceased to publish political cartoons about
him. See Robbie Steel, Joint Operating Agreements in the Newspaper Indus-
try: A Threat to First Amendment Freedoms, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 275, 309 n.168
(1989).
109. See BAGDIKIAN, supra note 89, at 212.
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maximize profits in order to please shareholders."'  Local
news coverage suffers because it has become more expensive
to produce."' Though the coverage has changed, the use of
resources has become more efficient." 2 Newspaper chains can
take the work of a journalist in one city and syndicate it in
the rest of their newspapers throughout the country. 113
Newspaper chains can also purchase international news, car-
toons, and features through news services. According to
one study, independent newspapers contained twenty-three
percent more local and national news than corporately-held
newspapers.15
In addition, the press in the economic market lacks cov-
erage on corporations and newspapers themselves and issues
affecting corporate interests."6 Journalists have stated that
corporate owners fear reporting on themselves and their fi-
nancial peers."' A survey conducted by the American Society
of Newspaper Editors found that thirty-three percent of all
editors working for media conglomerates said they probably
would not run a story that damaged their parent corpora-
tion." 8 This response is reasonable considering that every
year corporations fire editors and journalists for reporting
stories that their parent corporation did not like."9 Nonethe-
less, some newspaper chains do continue to operate with
sound and autonomous management in their pursuit of qual-
ity content.
12
110. Seeid. at 90-92.
111. Seeid at212.
112. Seeid
113. Seeid.
114. SQUIRES, supra note 105, at 216-17.
115. Keith Conrad, Media Mergers: First Step in a New Shift ofAntitrust
Anaysis, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 675, 682 (1997) (citing Maura Christopher, How
Profits Shape News Companies and the News, SCHOLASTIC UPDATE, Apr. 26,
1985, at 10).
116. See BAGDIKIAN, supra note 89, at 30-45.
117. See id. at xvi (commenting on the coverage of corporate America).
118. Seeid. at 30, 217.
119. See id. at 36-37.
120. ISAACS, supra note 96, at 21.
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2. The Broadcast Industry
In recent years, broadcast regulations have allowed more
concentration of ownership. 2' Approved in 1943,122 the scar-
city rationale distinguished broadcast from print media and
justified the industry's regulation. 12  Technological innova-
tion and the onset of cable television have made the broadcast
spectrum less limited.24  In 1984, the Supreme Court ac-
knowledged difficulties with justifying broadcast regulations
on scarcity, 12 ' but would not reconsider the rationale without
some official indication from Congress. 126 In 1987, the FCC
recognized the diminished value of the fairness doctrine and
terminated the doctrine's use, finding it did not serve the
public interest and went against First Amendment princi-
ples. 27 In its report, the FCC commented on the increase of
121. See infra Part II.C.2.
122. See Nat'l Broad., 319 U.S. 190 (introducing the scarcity doctrine).
123. The theory developed due to the situation of the broadcasting industry
before 1927. Id. at 213. Many people wanted to broadcast, but the Secretary of
Commerce had no power to impose restrictions or deny licenses to qualified ap-
plicants. Id. at 212. As a result, people who had a license in an area with no
available broadcast band broadcasted on any frequency they wanted, regardless
of the interference they caused. Id. Confusion and chaos ensued, with every-
body on the air and no one being heard. Id. As a means of communication, ra-
dio had limited facilities and the spectrum was not large enough to accommo-
date all who want to use it. Id. at 213. In other words: "There is a fixed natural
limitation upon the number of stations that can operate without interfering
with one another." Id. at 212-13.
124. See David L. Bazelon, The First Amendment and the New Media'- New
Directions in Regulating Telecommunications, 31 FED. COMM. L.J. 201, 207
(1979).
125. Federal courts recognized the weakness of the scarcity rationales. Lov-
eday v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1443, 1459 (D.C. Cir. 1983). "The number of broadcast
stations ... rivals and perhaps surpasses the number of newspapers and maga-
zines. . . ." Id.
126. The Court recognized that the doctrine was widely criticized, noting that
even the Chairman of the FCC questioned its validity. See FCC v. League of
Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. at 364, 376 n.l (1984).
127. See In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council Against Television Sta-
tion WTVH, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2 FCC Rcd. 5043, para. 61, 98
(rel. Aug. 6, 1987); Charles D. Ferris & Terrence J. Leahy, Red Lions, Tigers
and Bears: Broadcast Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 38 CATH.
U. L. REV. 299 (1989).
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broadcast stations and stated that broadcasting was no
longer a scarce resource.
2
1
The Telecommunications Act of 1996129 became the first
large-scale modification of telecommunications laws in sixty-
one years. Although the Act addressed some of the concerns
over the rise of digital television, the strong lobbying effects
of the media oligopolies'3 ° changed the broadcast and cable
industries.'"' Though President Clinton and others wrote
that "the legislation should protect and promote diversity of
ownership and opinions in the mass media,32 the Act loos-
ened the antitrust laws in the television and radio indus-
tries' by raising ownership and audience-reach limits.3 The
128. See FCC Report: General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast
Licensees, 102 F.C.C. 2d 143 (1985).
129. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613 (Supp. III 1997)) (amend-
ing the Communications Act of 1934).
130. An oligopoly is a market condition in which sellers are so few that the
actions of any one of them will materially affect price and hence have a measur-
able impact on competitors. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 916 (High
School ed. 1982). Since so few corporations own so much of the press, they are
considered an oligopoly. See BAGDIKIAN, supra note 89, at 13 ("[N]ot only be-
cause the limited number of owners, but because in most cities the dominant
stations have virtually guaranteed high profits...").
131. See Fox Television Stations v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1033 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (stating the Telecommunications Act of 1996 began the process of deregu-
lating cable and broadcast television). The Act relaxed limits on broadcast
ownership and addressed other areas of telecommunications law. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 151 (Supp. III 1997). The Act changes current policy and allows cable and
telephone businesses to compete with each other and permits local telecommu-
nications companies to enter the long-distance market. See Thomas G. Krat-
tenmaker, The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 29 CONN. L. REV. 123, 128
(1996).
132. Cheryl Heuton, Radio's Deregulation Dilemma: Politicians, Stations
Turn Up the Volume on Ownership Limits Debate, MEDIAWEEK, Nov. 13, 1995,
at 12 (stating that competition is important to the free expression of ideas and
will be lost if there are too few owners).
133. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 24, at 37.
134. See Krattenmaker, supra note 131, at 131 (discussing § 202(a)-(b)(1) of
the Act). The Act eliminated a twelve station ownership limit on national radio
broadcasters and raised the number of stations that one broadcaster could own
in any one market. See id. The Act also increased the national audience reach
limit for a single television broadcaster from twenty-five percent of homes to
thirty-five percent of homes. See Fox TV Stations, Inc., at 1034 (D.C. Cir.
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FCC also eliminated national radio ownership caps from their
rules. 135 They did, however, preserve local ownership restric-
136tions.' 3
The 1996 Act also addressed concerns over the emerging
digital television industry. Congress chose not to sell or
auction the right to broadcast digital television, but effec-
tually gave the right to existing broadcasters for free.138 The
result has been described as a "huge giveaway" of a "$70 bil-
lion national asset.'' 139 Congress also declined to address digi-
tal public interest obligations and delegated to the FCC the
decision of whether and in what form to impose such obliga-
tions. 4 ° The Act has accelerated concentration of media out-
lets and magnified the power held by media oligopoly by al-
lowing the existing media owners to acquire more channels of
communication.1
2002), modified, 293 F.3d 357 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing Amendment of Multiple
Ownership Rules, Report & Order, 100 F.C.C.2d paras. 4, 108-12). In June
2003, the FCC raised the national audience reach limit to forty-five percent.
See FCC Adopts New Rules that Generally Permit Companies to Own More
Media Businesses Than They Could Before, 25 ENT. LAW REP. 2 (July 2003).
The public response was the largest outcry against the FCC in its history. See
Louis Jacobson & Bara Vaida, Broadcast Blues, NAT'L J., Aug. 9, 2003. Con-
gress is working to pass a bill that repeals the FCC decision. Id.
135. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56,
110 (1996). The Act directs the FCC to modify 47 C.F.R. 73.3555 (1996), elimi-
nating restrictions on the total number of AM or FM broadcast stations or tele-
vision stations one person or entity could own within the United States. Id.
136. Seeid. at 110-11.
137. See id. at 114.
138. See 47 U.S.C. § 336(a) (1997); see also Dugger, supra note 95, at 37.
139. What Price ofDigital Television, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1998, at A26; see
also Federal Management of the Radio Spectrum: Advanced Television Services:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. And Fin. of the House Comm. on
Commerce, 104th Cong. 82 (1996) (statement of Robert M. Pepper, Chief, Office
of Plans and Policy, FCC) (stating that an auction would bring between $11 to
$70 billion in revenue).
140. See 47 U.S.C. § 336(d).
141. See Jay Harris, What's Missing from Your News, in THE BUSINESS OF
JOURNALISM 147-49 (William Serrin ed., 2000). For example, Time Warner
owns twenty-four magazines, several cable stations, including CNN, TNT,
HBO, CNN-SI, and part of Court TV, and owns cable monopolies in twenty-two
of the largest markets, as well as movie studios, various book publishers and
record labels; Disney owns the ABC television and radio stations, ten other ma-
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3. The Scarcity Doctrine Applied to News Media
The scarcity issues presented by the broadcast medium
justify the differing First Amendment protection of print and
broadcast. 142 Regulation of the broadcasting industry is con-
stitutional because the scarcity of the medium requires regu-
lation to achieve the diverse viewpoints contemplated by the
First Amendment.143 Although this rationale creates the pub-
lic interest obligation in the regulation of broadcast, the Su-
preme Court has justified regulation using two different scar-
city rationales: numerical and allocational. 4 4  Although the
government adopted the scarcity doctrine in response to allo-
cational scarcity, technological advances have increased the
spectrum, causing a shift from an allocational scarcity ra-
tional to a numerical scarcity rationale.1 45 Though the broad-
cast industry has moved toward deregulation,'46 history has
shown that without regulation, media concentration is inevi-
table. 147 Even though the newspaper industry does not suffer
the technological limitations that create allocational scarcity,
it has become a numerically scarce industry.1 8 When the ra-
tionale was first adopted, 41 the United States had 2,043 daily
jor television stations, twenty-one other radio stations, ESPN, part of A&E,
theme parks and various book and magazine publishers; General Electric owns
NBC and, in partnership with Microsoft, MSNBC. See id
142. See Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502-03 (1952).
143. See Nat Broad, 319 U.S. at 213.
144. See id. (assuming in its analysis that allocational scarcity is the basis
for the FCC's jurisdiction); see also Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
400 (1969). Numerical scarcity concerns the number of broadcast stations, and
allocational scarcity deals with the reality that the broadcast spectrum simply
is not large enough to accommodate everyone who wants to use it. Id.
145. See FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 364 (1984).
146. See Monroe E. Price, Taming Red Lion: The First Amendment and
Structural Approaches to Media Regulation, 31 FED. COMM L.J. 215, 220-21
(1979); see also Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat.
110 (codified as amended 47 U.S.C. § 151 (Supp. III 1997)).
147. See supra Part II.C.1 (explaining that because newspapers are not regu-
lated, their ownership has become increasingly concentrated in the hands of a
few corporations).
148. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1991, No. 919, at 556 (1991).
149. See Natl Broad Co., 319 U.S. at 212-14.
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newspapers, compared to a total of 967 radio stations.5 ° By
1987, the number of newspapers had dropped to 1,646, but
the number of radio stations had increased to 6,519." In ad-
dition to the numerical scarcity faced by the print media, high
economic barriers make it challenging to start a newspaper,
thereby creating economic scarcity.
52
III. THE PROBLEM: THE PRESS IN THE ECONOMIC
MARKETPLACE
A. The Economic 'Marketplace of Ideas"
Although objectivity, or lack of bias, is one of the most
fundamental goals in the ethics of journalism, 153 objectivity
tends to hide the effects of economic competition.5 1 In Miami
Herald the Supreme Court recognized that the press makes
decisions necessarily based on subjective editorial judg-
ments,""' and the ability to make these choices give the media
enormous power to "manipulate public opinion and change
the course of events."5 6 The problem arises when the media
does not represent extreme views; and therefore, public de-
bate misses some important perspectives that could play an
important role in self-governance.'57
150. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1991 ABSTRACT, supra note 148, at 561;
see U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES,
Series R 232-243, at 810 (1975).
151. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 150,
at 810.
152. See Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 251 (1974) (describing the
economic barriers to starting a newspaper enterprise, but ultimately rejecting
the economic scarcity argument as justifying newspaper regulation).
153. See Soc'y of Professional Journalists, Code of Ethics (1996), available at
http://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp.
154. See Alberto Bernabe Riefkohl, Freedom of the Press and the Business of
Journalism: The Myth of Democratic Competition in the Marketplace of Ideas,
67 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 447, 458 (1998).
155. See Miami Herald, 418 U.S. at 256.
156. Id. at 249.
157. Many Supreme Court decisions dealing with freedom of the press adopt
the view that the media operates as a "fourth estate" that serves as a check on
government. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587
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It is reasonable for the American public to question
whether the "marketplace of ideas" provides enough choices
within the market to warrant calling it a "market." The nar-
row views presented in the media, as well as the reasons for
that self-censorship, remain a reality. 58 The press's actions
in the aftermath of September 11 are not unique, but they do
provide an excellent example of the dangers of this self-
censorship when taken to an extreme. 
1 59
B. September 11 as an Example of Self-Censorship
Patriotism flourished in the wake of September 11. Peo-
ple hung flags and wore pins, some to show their support for
the Administration or the war effort, and others simply to
show patriotic sentiment and solidarity.6 The criticism of
the Bush Administration stopped temporarily, and the public
attacked anyone who did criticize. 6 ' Journalism responded.'62
Publishers and networks, more silent than usual, acted on
their perception that the majority of the public believed in the
suppression of speech critical of the government.163
In an article for The New Yorker,"M Susan Sontag criti-
cized television stations' coverage of the event, calling it "self-
(1980) (stating that "[i]t has a structural role to play in securing and fostering
our republican system of self government"); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
158. See generally Kahn, supra note 90.
159. See discussion infra Part III.B. For an additional example, see Office of
Comm. of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 997-98 (D.C. Cir.
1966). The case concerns a Mississippi broadcast television station refusing to
broadcast pro-integration programming but allowed segregationist program-
ming. Id.
160. See Susan Gellman, Enduring and Empowering: The Bill of Rights in
the Third Millennium: The First Amendment in a Y"me That Tries Men's Souls,
65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 87, 93 (2002).
161. See Marin R. Scordato and Paula A. Monopoli, Free Speech Rationales
After September 11th: The First Amendment in Post- World Trade Center
America, 13 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 185, 188 (2002).
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See Susan Sontag, The Talk of the Town, NEW YORKER, Sept. 24, 2001,
at 32.
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righteous drivel and outright deceptions."'' 5 As a result, the
public severely condemned her.'66 After the University of
California at Berkley's student-run newspaper published a
political cartoon of two Muslims entering hell and celebrating
their arrival, the students protested and demanded a front-
page apology.'67 The paper refused, and in response the stu-
dent senate eliminated the paper's funding.168
Some media outlets did not wait for the public to respond
to provocative dissent and started to censor their reporters to
avoid conflict. The Daily Grant Courier fired columnist Dan
Guthrie after he called the President an embarrassment and
criticized his absence in Washington on September 11.169
Texas City Sun fired columnist Tom Gutting after he criti-
cized Bush's actions after the attack.7 ' In effect, the anticipa-
tion of the public's failure to tolerate different views of cur-
rent events silenced the dissent necessary for a working
democracy and prevented the news from presenting a more
balanced perspective of events. 7'
IV. ANALYSIS
Free-market theorists understand that profit driven me-
dia corporations respond to market forces like any other
165. Id.
166. See Celestine Bohlen, Think Tank; In New War on Terrorism, Words
Are Weapons, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2001, at All.
167. See Debra J. Saunders, Editorial, University of Censorship's Fall Se-
mester, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 11, 2001, at A25.
168. See id.
169. See Adair Lara, This Is No Time to Keep Your Mouth Shut, S.F.
CHRON., Oct. 2, 2001, at B8.
170. See Bill Carter & Felicity Barringer, Drums of Patriotism Drown Voices
of Dissent, PITT. POST GAZETTE, Sept. 30, 2001, at A21. Gutting stated that
Bush was "flying around the country like a scared child, seeking refuge in his
mother's bed after having a nightmare." Id.
171. See EDWARD HERMAN & NOAM CHOMSKY, MANUFACTURING CONSENT
17 (1988) ("[W]ith increasing market pressure for financial performance and the
diminishing constraints from regulation, an advertising-based media system
will gradually increase advertising time and marginalize or eliminate alto-
gether programming that has significant public-affairs content.").
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profit driven corporation. 171 Criticizing the FCC's efforts to
improve the quality of broadcast programming, professors
Krattenmaker and Powe state: "[Q]uality is a function of
viewer's desires and broadcasters' resources, elements the
FCC cannot control. 17' Judge Posner also supposes that net-
works develop and select programming in a capitalistic fash-
ion, 7 4 illustrating his idea in a hypothetical:
171
If one company owns all the television stations in an area,
it would put on a variety of shows in each time slot so as
to appeal to every available group. 176 If there were two
stations (and no cable) and 90 percent of the market
wanted to watch comedy from 7 to 8 p.m. but 10 percent
wanted to watch ballet at that time, the company would
broadcast each program on different channels to gain the
100 percent audience. 177  If there were two competing
companies each would broadcast comedy from 7 to 8 p.m.
because the expected audience share would be 45 percent,
which is greater than the 10 percent that want to watch
ballet.7 7 The same slot on each station would be filled
with "popular" programming and minority tastes would go
unserved. 1
79
For the corporate executives, professionalism demands
programming and printing decisions that will maximize
revenue.' Usually the decisions of advertisers to buy time
172. See THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE, JR., REGULATING
BROADCAST PROGRAMMING 74 (1994) (arguing that regulation of the broadcast
industry should be based on the same principles used for print media, where
control of editorial content lies in private hands rather than the government).
173. Id.
174. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 672-74 (1992).
175. Id. This is a paraphrase of the actual hypothetical given by Posner. See
id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See id.
180. Edward Rubin, Television and the Experience of Citizenship, 68 TEX. L.
REV. 1155, 1158 (1990). "Television executives certainly do not see themselves
as opinion leaders. They live in terror of ratings and perceive their basic task
as predicting the public's response." Id.
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and space during the programs and newspapers in question
generate this revenue.' Maximum audiences attract maxi-
mum dollars from advertisers."' Thus, advertising dollars
are the network's objective, 11 since corporate officers owe a
fiduciary duty to shareholders to make business decisions
that will maximize profits."M
Due to advertising, the free-market system tends to drive
out the media companies that depend on revenue from sales
alone.' The economic survival of each publication and sta-
tion depends on its ability to secure an audience with con-
sumer interests that attract the attention of advertisers.1
86
This is necessary because advertisers want to buy space and
time in media that their customers, and more importantly,
potential customers read and watch."' Concerned with
attracting audiences with buying power,'88 media's corporate
owners make editorial judgments based on what they think
this segment of the audience wants to see or hear.' Thus the
need for advertising can cause the media to avoid controver-
sial issues.9 °
As the media becomes more concerned with staying com-
petitive, its objective changes: it must not alienate the pub-
lic.' The news becomes more mainstream as it presents po-
litical speech from the middle of the political spectrum.'92
Since advertisers can pull support from the media in re-
181. See id.
182. See Jacobson & Vaida, supra note 134.
183. See TODD GITLIN, INSIDE PRIME TIME 24-5 (1983).
184. See United States v. Byrun, 408 U.S. 125, 138 (1972) (stating that direc-
tors have a fiduciary duty to promote the interests of the corporation and have a
responsibility to stockholders).
185. See HERMAN & CHOMSKY, supra note 171, at 14.
186. Id. at 16.
187. See SQUIRES, supra note 104, at 214-16, 218-19.
188. See id.
189. See Randall P. Bezanson, The Future of the First Amendment, 37 S.D.
L. REV. 11, 17-18 (1992).
190. See Kahn, supra note 90, at 739.
191. See supra Part III.A.
192. See id. at 758.
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sponse to content that may alienate the audience,' 9' the press
often avoids controversy and debate by presenting opinion
that is acceptable to the general public.14 Though the press
does present some open debate by featuring analysts and col-
umnists with different views, these people often do not repre-
sent the full spectrum of opinion.' 95 They represent the seg-
ment of ideas that will not alienate the majority of society. 96
The state of the media immediately following September
11 illustrates this analysis. Reporters are patriotic and after
September 11 many television news reporters wore pins and
ribbons to show their support.197 The problem arises when
reporting itself becomes biased or even appears to be bi-
ased.'98 For example, a local television station in Ohio ran
promotional advertisements announcing, "We want you to
know we stand 100 percent behind the President."'99 If the
press does not question the government and discover poten-
tial problems, the general public may not do so either.2 °" In
matters of opinion, people tend to believe what the people
around them believe. If the press does not present outside
opinions, existing opinion cannot change. ABC spokesman
Jeffery Schneider said it best:
Especially in a time of crises, the most patriotic thing
journalists can do is to remain as objective as possible.
That does not mean journalists are not patriots. All of us
are at a time like this. But we cannot signal how we feel
about a cause, even a justified and just cause .... 0'
Immediately following the terrorist attacks, the press re-
193. See supra Part I (describing the cancellation of Bill Maher's Politically
Incorrect).
194. See HERMAN & CHOMSKY, supra note 171, at 17, 305.
195. See Riefkohl, supra note 154, at 464.
196. See id.
197. See Gellman, supra note 160, at 93.
198. See generally Elliot D. Cohen, Journalism, Rational Subjectivity, and
Democracy, 9 J. LAW & PUB. POLY 191 (1998).
199. See Gellman, supra note 160, at 93.
200. See HERMAN & CHOMSKY, supra note 171, at 297.
201. Howard Kurtz, Peter Jennings, In the News for What He Didn't Say,
WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 2001, at C1.
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ported speculation on the next bomb attack, the responsible
,,122Botparty, and the possibility of winning this "war. Boosting
both ratings and profits, the press exploited the public's emo-
tions of grief and shock."°3 Although the nation knew of Al
Queda due to previous bombings and bombing attempts,
many had no idea that an entire region of the world despised
the United States and everything it represented.2 4
Certainly, the press is not the sole reason for this educational
deficit.205 The public has an obligation to keep itself informed
and ask questions, but without the tools necessary to ask
those questions, the public cannot protect itself, and everyone
loses.0 6
202. See, e.g., Margery Eagan, War on Terrorism; It's Not too Early to Remi-
nisce on Bygone Safe Days, BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 20, 2001, at 14; Enough
Brave Words; Terrorists Have Been Waging War. ft's 'me to Respond in Kind,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 12, 2001, at A27; Michael Cabanatuan &
Lynda Gledhill, Bridges Not Targeted, FBI Says; Tip on Attacks Unfounded-
Alert Remains, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 7,2001, at Al.
203. See Phyllis Kaniss, Bad News: Too Few Reporters, AM. JOURNALISM
REV., Sept. 1993, at 20.
The old joke about local news is that "if it bleeds, it leads." But it is the
corollary that should concern us: If it doesn't bleed - or choke with emo-
tion - it doesn't air. Unfortunately, most matters of public consequence
fail to pass the blood-and-tears litmus test of local television news.
Id. See also Jacqueline E. Sharkey, The Television War, AM. JOURNALISM REV.,
May 2003, at 18.
204. While the American public was mostly unaware of these feeling before
9/11, press coverage on the subject flourished afterwards. See, e.g., John F.
Burns, America Inspires Both Longing and Loathing in Arab World, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 16, 2001, at A4; Sohail Hashmi, The Terrorists'Zealotry Is Politi-
cal Not Religious, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2001; Salman Rushdie, Yes, This Is
About Islam, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2001; Stephen W. Bosworth et al., Why Do
TheyHate Us?, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 16, 2001, at D1, D2.
205. For example, the condition of the United States educational system is
constantly under attack for not adequately educating the nation's youth. See,
e.g., Glenn Delk, Schools' Dismal Record Shows Need for Choice, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Aug. 14, 2003, at 15A (reporting on the disparity in education between
schools); Kimberly Miller, 88% of Schools Flunk Under U.S. Law, PALM BEACH
POST, Aug. 9, 2003, at AlA (discussing the disparity between state educational
standards and the federal "No Child Left Behind" Act, 20 U.S.C. § 6316 (2003)).
For the 2003 school year, Florida schools were required to have only thirty-one
percent of students reading on grade level and thirty-eight percent in math on
grade level in order to meet state standards. Id.
206. See HERMAN & CHOMSKY, supra note 171, at 297.
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The First Amendment protects the press, and ultimately
the public, from government control but provides no protec-
tion from private censorship. °7 This in no way makes the lat-
ter less important or dangerous than the former.08 Current
First Amendment doctrine provides no help by protecting
corporate speech at the expense of the public's right to
know.0 9 If the chief policies underlying "freedom of the press"
is ensuring that the public remains objectively informed and
is provided with a variety of ideas to self-govern, the media in
an economic market directly conflicts with this purpose.
Consequently, the American public must protect this funda-
mental value. Many of the consumers in this marketplace do
not know that they must demand information both critical
and independent of government policy. 20 The goal of robust
public debate, signifies that governmental regulation of the
market has finally become beneficial.21'
Perhaps the time has come for the government to regu-
late the market, protect it from unavoidable censorship, and
ensure the elimination of oligopolies so that different opinions
compete with one another in a fair way.212 Although this ide-
207. The Constitution, and the First Amendment, apply only to state and
federal government. They do not apply to private individuals. See, e.g., Associ-
ated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) ("Freedom of the press from
governmental interference under the First Amendment does not sanction re-
pression of that freedom by private interests."). For the First Amendment to
apply to private individuals, they must be acting on behalf of the state. See,
e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982) (stating that to find state
action, deprivation of right must be caused by an exercise of right or privilege
created by state or rule of conduct imposed by the state, and the party charged
with deprivation must fairly be considered to be acting on behalf of the state).
208. See Gellman, supra note 160, at 88 (discussing the First Amendment's
role as a "safety valve on a majority-rules democracy"). Compare Turner Broad.
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 657 (1994) ("The First Amendment's command
that government not impede the freedom of speech does not disable the gov-
ernment from taking steps to ensure that private interests not restrict, through
physical control of a critical pathway of communication, the free flow of infor-
mation and ideas.").
209. See Dugger, supra note 95, at 39.
210. See Entman, supra note 14, at 76.
211. Seeid. at 78, 79.
212. See NatY Broad., 319 U.S. at 196.
PROTECTING DISSENT
ology appears to be in direct conflict with the literal meaning
of the press clause, only print journalism is given a literal ap-
plication of the clause, and regulating the industry in order to
preserve diversity could conform with the framers' intent in
drafting the clause.213 Justice Brandeis expressed it best:
To justify government suppression of free speech there
must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will
result if free speech is practiced. There must be reason-
able ground to believe that the danger apprehended is
imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe
214that the evil to be prevented is a serious one.
V. PROPOSAL: CAN THE GOVERNMENT SAVE US FROM
OURSELVES?
Though the trend has been toward deregulation of the
broadcast media,215 the answer to protecting the "freedom of
the press" from the effects of competition may lie in the regu-
lation of the press as an industry, rather than treating the
different types of media differently.1 6 Three proposals of gov-
ernment regulation of the press follow: disclosure, which is
based in part the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA);1 7 economic incentives, also based upon regulation in
the environmental industry;21 and voluntary self-regulation,
213. See Thrner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 622, 657.
214. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring).
215. For a discussion of regulation of the broadcast media, see infra Part I.B.
216. But see LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 85 (1991) (sug-
gesting that the different regulatory regimes for the broadcast and print media
are well-suited).
217. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1994).
218. A number of countries use pollution taxes and tax credits to create eco-
nomic incentives to help the environment. These incentives take various forms:
credits for utilizing particular technologies, taxes on the use of certain raw ma-
terials that contribute to environmental contamination, taxes on the use of cer-
tain environmentally unfriendly technologies, taxes on products that do not
meet certain environmental standards when utilized, and taxes on the quantity
of a pollutant discharged. For an overview of the various types of taxes and the
countries that are utilizing them, see DAVID ROODMAN, THE NATURAL WEALTH
OF NATIONS: HARNESSING THE MARKET FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 144-66 (Linda
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based in part upon the previous NAB Code.1 9
A. Disclosure
Many statutes and regulations require the disclosure of
information. 2 ° The most famous of these is the National En-
vironmental Policy Act (NEPA).22' The goal of the NEPA is to
require the government to compile and disclose environmen-
tally-related information before going forward with any pro-
jects having a major effect on the environment. 22 The NEPA
does not require the government to weigh specific factors or
act to reduce the possible effects.2  The purpose is to trigger
safeguards.224 The NEPA assumes that if the public is not in-
different, it will speak out, and the government will have to
respond.
A viable alternative to direct regulation, information dis-
closure costs far less and operates more efficiently than direct
regulation.226 Imposing this type of regulation on the press
Starke ed., 1998).
219. See NAB Code, supra note 51.
220. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2003) (requiring
federal agencies to disclose certain information to the public); Truth in Lending
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (2002) (mandatory disclosure of credit terms); Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (2000) (requiring disclosure
of campaign funds).
221. See42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1994).
222. See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic
Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
223. See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223,
227-28 (1980).
224. See id. at 227 ("NEPA, while establishing 'significant substantive goals
for the Nation,' imposes upon agencies duties that are 'essentially procedural."'
"NEPA was designed 'to insure a fully informed and well-considered deci-
sion ..... "' (quoting Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S.
519, 558 (1978)).
225. The NEPA is predominately a policy act which sets a course for public
action but is not a regulatory, self-enforcing statute; it requires action by Con-
gress and the President. See Lynton K. Caldwell, Beyond NEPA: Future Sig-
nificance of the National Environmental Policy Act, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
203, 204 (1998). This supposes that the public will speak out to their represen-
tatives, unless the effect on the environment would be so egregious that Con-
gress and the President have no choice but to act. See id.
226. See ANTHONY OGUS, REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC THEORY
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industry would hopefully have the same type of effect on the
public as that of NEPA: for example, every quarter broad-
casters could be required to fully disclose their range of public
interest and public service activities and the amount of times
opposing viewpoints were presented. The FCC could require
completion of a simple form to ensure accurate and uniform
accounting and could sanction those that failed to do so.
Planning for the same response from the public as the
NEPA assumes, this type of disclosure would create public
pressure for improvement and accountability.227 The success
of this type of regulation depends upon the existence of moni-
toring and the power of the monitors to impose harms on
those with poor records.228  For example, environmental
groups have mobilized when disclosure shows high levels of
toxic emissions. Anticipating this mobilization, some compa-
nies reduced emissions voluntarily.229 Of course, it is impos-
sible to predict whether the effect of voluntary change would
occur in the press industry. Disclosure works best if market
or political pressures are likely to result in significant costs
for those with poor performance. In the environmental con-
text, disclosure worked most effectively when companies
feared the consequences. 230 In the media context, if the FCC
has the ability to revoke or refuse broadcast licenses to those
who do not promote the public interest, companies would
likely ensure their actions conformed with the public inter-
est.
231
121-49 (1994).
227. See Johanna Rinceanu, Enforcement Mechanisms in International En-
vironmentalLaw. Quo Vadunt, 15 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 147, 161 (2000).
228. See NEIL GUNNINGHAM et al., SMART REGULATION: DESIGNING
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 296-300 (1999).
229. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL et al., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW,
SCIENCE AND POLICY 612-16 (2d 1996).
230. See id. at 68-69.
231. This section ignores print journalism, because the comment assumes
that the industries are not regulated in the same way. Assuming that print is
treated like broadcast, a similar proposition for license revocability would be
appropriate.
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B. Economic Incentives: Taxes, Licenses, and 'Play or Pay"
Ronald Coase's work on efficiency, free trades, and
transaction costs originated in communications, but has
greatly influenced the environmental area. 32 In that area, as
in the press industry, rigid government controls dissatisfy the
public, which wants a movement toward more flexible eco-
nomic strategies... in the form of pollution fees and tradeable
emission rights.14  The educational programming and free
advertising for presidential election requirements in the
broadcast industry illustrate how this proposal would work in
the media. Suppose one station is in a better position of pro-
viding educational programming than providing free air time
and another station is in the opposite position. The govern-
ment could allow them to each pay a fee, or tax, relieving the
stations of the requirement of providing one of these pro-
grams. Alternatively, the government might allow one sta-
tion to sell the other station its required obligation.35 This
approach creates a problem with determining a formula to
calculate how much tax the respective stations should pay.
The easiest way to administer a flexible requirement sys-
tem is a "play or pay" approach. 6 Despite reservations, this
approach succeeded in the environmental area.3 People ob-
jected that it would legitimize avoidance.. or result in "hotspots."' These reservations have proved unconvincing.4
232. See R.H. Coase, The Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas, 64 AM.
ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 384 (1974), reprinted in R.H. COASE, ESSAYS ON
ECONOMICS AND ECONOMISTS 64 (1994).
233. See GUNNINGHAM, supra note 228, at 391-421.
234. For an overview, see Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sustein, Reinventing
the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 72-85 (1995).
235. This is the tradeable emission right model.
236. This approach is where media still has a presumptive obligation to pro-
vide public interest content, but can buy its way out by paying someone else to
provide the content instead.
237. See Robert N. Stavins, What Can We Learn from the Grand Policy Ex-
periment? Lessons from Allowance Trading, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 1998, at
69.
238. See STEVEN KELMAN, WHAT PRICE INCENTIVES?: ECONOMISTS AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 110-65 (1981).
239. These "hot spots" occur when the trades at issue result in a concentra-
[Vo1:44
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Using environmental protection regulations as broadcast
regulations would create a system where those who fail to
serve their public interest obligations must pay a fee is pref-
erable because it offers more flexibility than uniform obliga-
tions. 24' The concentration of all public interest requirements
in a small number of media may pose a problem,242 but the in-
dustry and the government could agree to take steps to avoid
this problem. A preventative action could include limitations
on the number of these transactions per year.
C. Voluntary Self-Regulation
Many industries have attempted a voluntary self-
regulation to avoid additional government oversight.243 Self-
regulation could be implemented through a "code of conduct"
similar to the one the National Association of Broadcasters
imposed for many years. 244 The FCC and the Supreme Court
eliminated the NAB code for antitrust reasons, the self-
regulation it provided played a role in many aspects of media
policy. 245 Although antitrust laws exist for good reason, per-
haps the government should not invoke them too readily or
grant an exemption so as to make a code of conduct possible.
Otherwise, the government would prevent an industry from
providing the kinds of benefits that provided, more crudely
and expensively, by direct regulation. 6
In many nations, including the United States, coopera-
tion of pollution in a single area.
240. See Stavins, supra note 237, at 82.
241. For an instructive discussion, see JAMES T. HAMILTON, CHANNELING
VIOLENCE: THE ECONOMIC MARKET FOR VIOLENT PROGRAMMING 285-322
(1998).
242. This concentration would be the converse of the environmental area's
"hot spots"; there would not be enough public interest representation in a ma-
jority of the media.
243. See Emily R. Caron, Blood, Guts & the First Amendment: Regulating
Violence in the Entertainment Media, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLY 89, 92 (2001).
244. See infra, Part I.B.
245. See Campbell, supra note 62, at 715-37.
246. See ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILLIP J. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL
SOCIETY 225-27 (1995).
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tive action has played a beneficial role in reducing the ad-
verse effects of the economic market.247 For the press, it pro-
vides flexibility and relieves the government from the role of
big brother.248 The press, and not the government, will define
what does and does not constitute acceptable behavior for the
institution as a whole. The press will make a "public an-
nouncement of the principles and practices that the industry
presumptively accepts as a guide to appropriate conduct and
also as a basis for evaluating and criticizing performance.
249
Enforcement of a code could be conducted as the previous
NAB Code was, 2  by the associations subscribing to it. At the
time of license renewal, the press would give a form to the
FCC to show compliance or to show the continuance of non-
compliance with the code. If the various media associations
are unwilling to enforce a code of this kind, 5' 1 a private group
could take the initiative and, if given the authority by indus-
try associations, sanction them according to the guidelines in
the code.
A code, by itself, would be a private set of guidelines,
raising no First Amendment concerns.252 Furthermore, the
Department of Justice and district courts have indicated that
247. Many international bodies attempt to certify quality in a kind of coop-
erative action designed to reduce adverse effects of market pressures. See
Micheal Prest, Profit Bows to Ethics, INDEPENDENT (London), Oct. 26, 1997, at
3.
248. See, e.g., Frank Valverde, The International Internet Rating System:
Global Protection for Children, Business, and Industry, 20 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 559, 572 (2000) (citing Monroe Price & Stefaan Verhulst, The Con-
cept of Self Regulation and the Internet, in PROTECTING OUR CHILDREN ON THE
INTERNET 150 (Jens Waltermann & Marcel Machill eds., 2000).
249. See Neil Gunningham & Joseph Rees, Industry Self-Regulation: An In-
stitutional Perspective, 19 LAW & POL'Y 363, 383 (1997).
250. See supra Part I.A.
251. For example, the National Association of Broadcasters decided not to
oppose the idea of a code, but did suggest serious concerns about government
enforcement of editorial freedom. See Paige Albiniak, Preparing for Battle,
BROAD. & CABLE, July 6, 1998, at 22.
252. This situation, however, assumes that the government does not man-
date implementation and acceptance of the code, which would create a First
Amendment issue.
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provisions like these would not violate the antitrust laws.
As previously mentioned, the prior broadcast code was elimi-
nated as a result of an antitrust action in which the Depart-
ment of Justice alleged that certain code provisions violated
the Sherman Act.5 4 In that instance, the complaint was nar-
row and the ruling25 would not invalidate a code of the sort
suggested here.5
VI. CONCLUSION
One cannot argue that the current press is truly free or
that it is thoroughly providing fuel for lively debate and con-
sideration of ideas."7 The press has become the slave of an
economic market2  answering to shareholders and advertis-
ers.259  Although the population consistently disapproves of
the state of the press, nothing can change in an unregulated
economic market until the "customers" stop buying the prod-
uct.26° This is unlikely to occur; even if the majority of the
253. See American Brands, Inc. v. National Ass'n for Broadcasters, 308 F.
Supp. 1166 (D.D. Cir. 1969) (refusing an injunction against a code forbidding
cigarette advertising); Am. Fed'n of Television and Radio Artists v. Nat'l Ass'n
of Broadcasters, 407 F. Supp. 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (upholding code standards
regarding advertising aimed at children).
254. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7 (2003).
255. See United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters, 536 F. Supp. 149
(1982).
256. Both the complaint and the ruling dealt with the NAB Code's limits on
advertising air time. Though the court found the effect and result to be "artifi-
cial manipulation of the supply of commercial television time, with the end re-
sult that the price of time is raised," the court never passed judgment on the
standards relating to programming. See id. at 152-53.
257. See supra Parts II-IV.
258. See HERMAN & CHOMSKY, supra 171, at 303.
259. See BAGDIKIAN, supra note 89, at 119, 265-66 (describing an average
17.1% return of equity for publicly traded newspaper companies in 1980 and a
five year average profit margin of 18.3%).
260. For an overview of the economic theory of supply and demand, see, e.g.,
E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST
AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS Ch. 2 (2003) (citing H. HOVENKAMP,
FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY (1999); GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE
(3d ed. 1966); Landes, Economics of Antitrust, in RICHARD A. POSNER & FRANK
H. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST 1055 (2d ed. 1981)).
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population believes that minority views are entitled to pres-
entation, they are unlikely to demand those views in the
news and are more likely to change the channel if presented
with those views. This does not, however, mean that the
press can ignore its responsibility of educating the public
about the world.
Not all of the press folds to the pressures of the market. 6'
Seemingly objective sources of information provide sufficient
information for the public to question government actions.
However, many media outlets have to succumb to the signifi-
cant market pressures in order to survive.262 The questions
surrounding September 11 epitomize the deficiencies in the
press. Many Americans had no idea that other nations and
terrorist groups hated the United States until after the 9/11
attack, which is surprising since it is not the first time Al
Queda and terrorism have been linked together.263 They also
could not fathom why that hatred was so extreme. If the
press does not inform the public as to the repercussions of
U.S. foreign policy or even the meaning of that policy, how
can the public protect itself from those in power and from
those nations that the policies have enraged?
Currently, the government and the courts do not give the
261. See Dugger, supra note 95, at 48.
262. See GERALD J. BALDASTY, THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF NEWS IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY 127-34 (Univ. of Wisconsin Press 1994) (1992) (describ-
ing the de-emphasis of politics in newspapers in accordance with market de-
mands); see also C. EDWIN BAKER, ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC PRESS 28-
29 (1994) (analyzing historical evidence and commentary to demonstrate that
advertising played a significant role in the decline of partisanship in American
newspapers).
263. While the American public was mostly unaware of these feelings before
9/11, press coverage on the subject flourished afterwards. See, e.g., John F.
Bums, After the Attacks: International Memo; America Inspires Both Longing
and Loathing in Arab World, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2001, at 1-4; Sohail Hashmi,
The Terrorists'Zealotry Is Political Not Religious, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2001;
Salman Rushdie, Yes, This Is About Islam, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2001, at A25;
Stephen W. Bosworth, Why Do They Hate Us? The Reasons Are Many, the His-
tory Long "Because We are so Big, so Powerful", BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 16, 2001,
at D1.
304 [Vo1:44
PROTECTING DISSENT
press clause in the First Amendment its literal meaning,"
except when applied to the print media.65 Yet the legislature
will not amend the language to state what the nation actually
interprets the language to mean."' If the focus of First
Amendment doctrine shifts from freedom of the corporate
press to compete with each other to the policy underlying the
amendment, the current state of First Amendment doctrine
will fail. If the policy behind the amendment is to provide a
marketplace of ideas and ensure an informed self-governance,
the industry needs protection from private as well as gov-
ernment forces.
A First Amendment jurisprudence animated
by a robust marketplace of ideas might actually
require governmental intervention to preserve that
diversity of ideas. Commercial by nature, the in-
stitutional media may be over-responsive to the
popularity of speech and may not give sufficient
exposure to unpopular opinions absent such gov-
ernmental intervention to protect those ideas...
[it] may most effectively fulfill its function as a
fourth estate only when affirmatively prodded and
211
encouraged to do so.
In light of the dangers of an economic marketplace of
ideas, the government needs to restructure the regulation of
the press. Without a change in the current informational sys-
tem, the public has little hope of governing itself by making
informed choices.
264. Laws penalizing perjury, bribery of government officials, excessive cor-
porate contributions to political candidates and the spread of classified mili-
tary information to foreign governments are all considered constitutional and
yet these laws violate a literal reading of the First Amendment.
265. See supra Part I.B.
266. See Scordato & Monopli, supra note 161, at 191.
267. Id. at 202.
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